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Sažetak
POLJE SLOBODNE PROCJENE, KONSENZUS, MORAL I 
PRAVA  RANJIVIH SKUPINA
Doktrina polja slobodne procjene jedna je od najkontraverznijih kreacija 
Europskog suda za ljudska prava, koja po mišljenju mnogih znanstvenika ometa 
razvoj univerzalnih standarda ljudskih prava. Sud je najčešće koristi kako bi 
se pozvao na mišljenje državnih vlasti o tomu što zaštita konvencijskih prava 
zahtijeva, kada ne postoji konsenzus, ili kada se vlasti pozivaju na zaštitu morala 
kao razlog za miješanje u konvencijska prava.
U ovom se članku kritizira takva upotreba doktrine, analizom interpretacije 
konsenzusa i morala u praksi Suda. Autorica tvrdi da pozivanje na mišljenje 
države u slučajevima kada ne postoji zajednički pristup među državama 
članicama ili kada se relevanto pitanje tiče (seksualnog) “morala”, predstavlja 
zapreku za učinkovitu zaštitu prava ranjivih skupina, jer je uvjetuje prihvaćanjem 
od strane većine država, odnosno većine unutar države. Autorica smatra da Sud 
ne bi trebao davati državama polje slobodne procjene da odluče o tomu koje 
standarde Konvencija nameće, već samo kako implementirati te standarde. Kod 
određivanja standarda, Sud bi se trebao voditi vrijednostima ravnopravnosti, 
autonomije i dostojanstva, a ne konsenzusom, što pretpostavlja traganje i 
osporavanje isključenosti i nepovoljnosti.
Ključne riječi: polje slobodne procjene, konsenzus, moral, prava ranjivih 
skupina.
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1. Introduction
The doctrine of the margin of appreciation is one of the most controversial 
developments of the European Court of Human Rights. It has been criticised widely 
as a means of preventing development of universal human rights standards.1 The 
Court has most often used the doctrine to defer to the state’s judgment on what the 
protection of Convention rights require where it finds no consensus on the issue, or 
where the government invokes the protection of morality as the reason for interference 
with Convention rights, in which cases the Court simply declares that there is no 
consensus on moral issues.
In this article the author criticises such a use of the doctrine, examining the ways 
consensus and morals that have been interpreted by the Convention organs. It will 
be argued that deference to the state’s judgment when there is a lack of a common 
approach among the member states on the relevant issue, or when the issue concern 
(sexual) ‘morality’ presents an obstacle for the effective protection of Convention 
rights, particularly the rights of vulnerable groups,2 as it conditions the protection of 
(their rights) with the acceptance by the majority of the states or the majority within 
the state. Furthermore, it will be argued, that the Court should never give the states the 
margin of appreciation to decide what standards the Convention imposes, but only in 
respect of how to implement these standards. In determining the standard, the Court 
should be guided by the values of autonomy, equality and human dignity, on which 
international human rights law is based,3 rather than on the question of consensus. 
When the rights of vulnerable groups are at issue, the questions of exclusion and 
disadvantage need to be addressed, namely,  1. whether the interests and perspectives 
of the vulnerable groups are omitted or misrepresented in the challenged norm or 
policy; 2. whether the omission or misrepresentation produces or perpetuates the 
disadvantage of these groups, and 3. how to change the norm or policy so as not to 
perpetuate or produce exclusion and disadvantage. 4
1  E Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards’ (1998-1999) 
31 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 843; G Letsas, ‘Two Concepts 
of the Margin of Appreciation’ (2006) 4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 705; Lord Lester of Herne 
Hill, ‘Universality versus Subsidiarity: A Reply’ (1998) European Human Rights Law Review 73.
2  In this category I place national, racial and sexual and gender minorities such as Roma, 
homosexuals, transsexuals, as well as politically less powerful groups, such as women.
3  See the Preamble of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 
1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR), and note that the European Convention on Human Rights 
was adopted as the first step for the collective enforcement of rights protected by the Declaration 
(as proclaimed in Preamble of the European Convention European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into 
force 3 September 1953) CETS No 005, 213 UNTS 221 (ECHR)).
4  These questions are built upon the main feminist method of asking the ‘woman question’. 
For the ‘woman question’ see K Bartlett, ‘Feminist Legal Methods’ (1990) 103 Harvard Law 
Review 829.
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2. Justification and the meaning of the doctrine 
The doctrine of the margin of appreciation is an expression of the principle of 
subsidiarity, which is one of the main interpretative principles of the Convention.5 
While this principle, as reflected in Articles 1 and 35 of the Convention, refers to 
a procedural priority of domestic over international enforcement of human rights,6 
it was given a more extensive meaning by the Convention organs. The Convention 
organs have advocated the idea that national authorities have a normative priority 
over international authorities. In other words, they have held that state organs have a 
greater legitimacy or are better placed than an international body to decide on human 
rights issues ‘due to their direct and continuous contact with vital forces of their 
society.’7 This normative conception of subsidiarity has led to the development of the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation.8 
In addition to the principle of subsidiarity, the democratic principle of separation 
of powers, according to which the Court has to exercise restraint in interpreting 
the Convention, so as not to overtake the task of elected representatives and thus 
undermine the principles of democracy, has been frequently invoked as a justification 
of the doctrine. 9  Finally, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation has been seen 
as necessary to protect the values of cultural diversity of the European countries.10 
However, as will be shown bellow, deferring to the state’s judgement when there is 
no consensus or in cases concerning the protection of morals undermines, rather than 
enhances, these goals.
The doctrine of the margin of appreciation has not been applied in a consistent 
manner. Most frequently it has been used as a tool of limiting the Court’s power of 
review in light of its role as an international court. When the Court uses the doctrine 
in this manner, it either simply defers to the judgment of the national authorities, or 
it relies on their judgment heavily but not exclusively. In addition to the use of the 
doctrine as a tool of limiting the scope of the Court’s review, the Court has on occasions 
5  The other two are the principle of effectiveness and the principle of balancing between 
individual rights and communal interests.
6  Principle of subsidiarity, as reflected in Articles 1, 13 and 35 of the Convention, means 
both that the states have the obligation to secure the Convention rights within their domestic sphere 
and that they must be given the opportunity to redress any individual violations of the Convention 
rights before they are brought before an international tribunal. 
7  Handyside v UK (App no 5493/72) (1976) Series A no 24.
8  The distinction between procedural and normative concept of subsidiarity can be traced 
to G Letsas, A Study on the Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights  (PhD 
thesis, UCL 2005).
9  P Mahoney, ‘Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the European Court of 
Human Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin’ (1990) 11 Human Rights Law Journal 57. For a 
critique see E Benvenisti, supra note 1.
10  P Mahoney, ‘Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism’ (1998) 
19 Human Rights Law Journal 1; E Brems ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-law of 
the European Court of Human Rights’ (1996) 56 Zeitschrift Fur Auslandisches Offentliches Recht 
Und Volkerrecht 240.
x 05 Radacic, The Margin.indd   601 31.5.2010   7:49:14
I. RADAČIĆ, The margin of appreciation, consensus, morality and...
Zb. Prav. fak. Rij. (1991) v. 31, br. 1, 599-616 (2010)602
used the doctrine to express its opinion on the balance between the individual rights 
and communal interests,11 in which cases the principle of proportionality has played 
a prominent role.12 The Court, thus, sometimes refers to the margin of appreciation 
after undertaking review, in a conclusion on whether a right was violated, stating 
that a right has been violated if the state overstepped the margin,13 or that it was 
not because the state acted within the margin.14 This inconsistent approach has been 
criticised by many commentators, who have described the doctrine as ‘a substitute 
for coherent legal analysis of the legal issues at stake’,15 and as a ‘tool of avoiding 
responsibility to articulate reasons for … decisions.’16
3. Development and the use of the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation
The doctrine of the margin of appreciation was first developed in the context of 
Article 15 (the derogation clause). The Court has been reluctant to review whether 
derogation of the Convention rights is justified, on the basis that national authorities 
are ‘better placed’ to assess the exigencies of a particular situation.17 Outside of 
this context, the doctrine has been applied most often in assessing the necessity of 
interference with the qualified rights,18 as well as Article 14 (non-discrimination 
norm),19 and in assessing the existence and the scope of positive obligations. In other 
words, the doctrine has been applied whenever a balancing of interests between 
individual rights and the community interest was involved. In addition, the doctrine 
11  Letsas terms such a use of the doctrine as a substantive concept of the margin of 
appreciation, which addresses the relationship between individual rights and collective goals. He 
differentiates this concept from what he calls the structural concept of the margin, which refers to 
the use of the margin as a tool limiting the scope of the Court’s review, in light of its role as an 
international court. Letsas, supra note 1.
12  Arai-Takashi defines the doctrine as the other side of the principle of proportionality. Z 
Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the 
Jurisprudence of the ECHR (2002).
13  Van Kück v Germany (App no 35968/97) ECHR 2003-VII, paras 84-85.
14  Janowski v Poland [GC] (App no 25716/94) ECHR 1999-I, para 35; Evans v UK [GC] 
(App no 6339/05) ECHR 2007-.
15  Lord Lester of Herne Hill, supra note 1.
16  RStJ  Macdonald, ‘The Margin of Appreciation’ in F Matscher and H Petzolds (eds), The 
European System for Protection of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1994). 
17  Greece v UK (App no 176/56) (1959) 2 Yearbook 174, 176 (EComHR).
18  Qualified rights are rights which contain what can be termed ‘general public interests 
limitations’, allowing states to interfere with rights in pursuit of other legitimate purposes, primarily 
of a collective nature (examples of which are listed in a non-exhaustive manner), provided that 
interference is in accordance with law and necessary in democratic society. The most well-known 
qualified rights are those contained in Articles 8 to 11 of the ECHR.
19  Under this article, different treatment of individuals in analogous situations (or same 
treatment of individuals in significantly different situations) can be justified provided there is 
objective and reasonable justification.
x 05 Radacic, The Margin.indd   602 31.5.2010   7:49:14
I. RADAČIĆ, The margin of appreciation, consensus, morality and...
Zb. Prav. fak. Rij. (1991) v. 31, br. 1, 599-616 (2010) 603
has been applied in interpreting certain vague Convention terms such as ‘persons of 
unsound mind’ in Article 5(1)(e) (right to liberty and security), as well as in cases 
involving the discretion of national authorities in an assessment of facts, such as 
an assessment of evidence in the context of Article 6 (right to a fair trial) of the 
Convention.
The Court extensively articulated the doctrine for the first time in Handyside 
v UK.20 In that case the Court examined whether the applicant’s conviction for 
disseminating an ‘obscene’ publication and the confiscation of copies of the 
publication in question (a book of a liberal outlook containing information on sexual 
and other issues intended for children and adolescents) were necessary in a democratic 
society for the protection of morals within the meaning of Article 10(2) (freedom of 
expression). In reviewing the necessity of these restrictions the Court held: 
by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their 
countries, state authorities are in principle in a better position than the 
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements 
[of moral] as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ and ‘penalty’… intended 
to meet them …Consequently, Article 10(2) leaves to the Contracting States a 
margin of appreciation.21 
The Court continued to explain that the margin of appreciation is not 
unlimited: 
The Court, which is, together with the Commission, responsible for ensuring the 
observance of those States engagements, is empowered to give the final ruling 
on whether the ‘restriction’ is reconcilable with the freedom of expression 
protected by Article 10. The domestic margin of appreciation thus goes hand in 
hand with a European supervision.22 
However, despite this qualification, the Court simply deferred to the state’s 
judgment on how moral is to be defined and what measures can legitimately be taken 
in order to protect it, on the basis that there was no uniform conception of morality 
in the member states. This is the Court’s general approach: when it decides that the 
margin should be wide, it defers to the state’s judgment, and finds no violation of the 
Convention. 
4. Factors influencing the width of the margin of appreciation
The width of the margin of appreciation depends on a number of factors: 
the nature of the right in question; the nature of the activities in question and their 
importance for the individual; the nature of the aims pursued and whether they 
20  Handyside v UK, supra note 7.
21  Ibid, para 48.
22  Ibid, para 49.
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concern general social and economic policies; the nature of the duty; the text of the 
Convention; the surrounding circumstances; and the existence of common grounds 
among member states, or in comparative or international law, or in public opinion.23 
The margin is generally narrower in the following circumstances: where the right 
is fundamental for democracy and the rule of law (such as freedom of expression, 
freedom from discrimination on the basis of sex and race, right to respect most 
fundamental aspects of private life, such as physical and moral integrity),24 where 
the activity is of the most intimate nature (such as sexual activity); and where there 
is consensus on the issue. 
On the other hand, it is generally wider when property rights are at issue; when 
the restrictions pursue the aims of the protection of national security, morality or 
religious feelings of others; where socio-economic policies, including planning 
policies are at issue; where positive obligations that would impose significant burdens 
on the community are at issue; and where there is a lack of consensus on the issue. 
The most relevant factor seems to be the existence or non-existence of consensus. 
5. Consensus 
Consensus is one of the main interpretative tools of the Court, connected both 
to the doctrine of the margin of appreciation and to the evolutive interpretation.25 In 
deciding what present-day developments require in terms of interpreting Convention 
rights and whether the margin given to the state should be narrow or wide, the Court 
generally, looks at whether a consensus exists on the issue in question. However, 
what constitutes a consensus is not defined in a consistent manner.26 
Most often the Court looks at the practices of the member states to determine the 
existence of a consensus.27 Where the Court finds divergence in approaches among 
member states, it usually leaves the state a wide margin of appreciation and finds 
23  See E Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague 2001) 357-380; P van Dijk and GJH van Hoff, ‘The margin of appreciation’ in Theory 
and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 
1998) 82-97. 
24  There is no margin with respect to negative obligations under unqualified rights, and a 
very narrow margin with respect of positive obligations under these rights. See for example Siliadin 
v France (App no 73313/01) ECHR 2005- ; MC v Bulgaria (App no 39272/98) ECHR 2003-VII.
25  Evolutive interpretation is an expression of the principle of effectiveness, according to 
which the Convention is a living instrument to be interpreted in light of present-day requirements. See 
Tyrer v UK, (App no 5856/72) (1978) Series A no 26, where the approach was first expounded.
26  Helfer identifies three distinct factors on which the Convention organs have relied in 
determining consensus: legal consensus, evidenced by the domestic law, international treaties or 
regional legislation; expert consensus; and European public consensus. LR Helfer, ‘Consensus, 
Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (1993) 26 Cornell International Law 
Journal 133.
27  Dudgeon v UK (App no 7525/76) (1981) Series A no 45; Rees v UK (App no 9532/81) 
(1986) Series A no 106; Cossey v the UK (App no 10843/84) (1990) Series A no 184; Sheffield and 
Horsham v UK (App nos 22985/93 and 23390/94) ECHR1998-V.
x 05 Radacic, The Margin.indd   604 31.5.2010   7:49:14
I. RADAČIĆ, The margin of appreciation, consensus, morality and...
Zb. Prav. fak. Rij. (1991) v. 31, br. 1, 599-616 (2010) 605
no violation of the Convention, sometimes even when there is a directly relevant 
international instrument on the issue.28 For example, in Chapman v UK, in which 
the applicants, travellers, challenged the refusal of planning permissions to station 
caravans on the land they owe, the Court gave states a wide margin of appreciation, 
due to a lack of a common approach, despite the existence of a number of international 
documents… ‘imposing obligations to protect special needs of minorities and their 
security, identity and lifestyle and improve housing situation of Roma’.29 The Court 
held that ‘emerging international consensus’ is not ‘sufficiently concrete for it to 
derive any guidance as to the conduct or standards which Contracting states consider 
desirable in any particular situation.’30 Similarly, in Frette v France, where the 
applicant challenged a refusal of authorisation to adopt, which he claimed was based 
on his homosexual lifestyle, the Court left state a wide margin of appreciation in light 
of a lack of a common approach among member states on the issue of homosexual 
adoption, despite the existence of international instruments prohibiting discrimination 
on the grounds of sexual orientation.31
Sometimes, however, the Court looks at progressive developments in 
comparative and international law as an indication of a consensus. For example, in 
Marckx v Belgium, the case challenging a failure to automatically recognise in law 
the ties between a mother and a child born out of wedlock, the Court looked at the 
developments in international law in respect of distinguishing between ‘legitimate’ 
and ‘illegitimate’ children to define the standard of treatment.32 In light of these 
developments, the Court narrowed the state’s margin, even though the conventions 
it referred to were only ratified by a few member states at the time of the judgment.33 
Similarly, in the case of Siliadin v France, which challenged a lack of adequate criminal 
provisions prohibiting domestic servitude, the Court held that effective deterrence 
requires criminalisation of acts prohibited by Article 4, referring to standards imposed 
by ILO and UN conventions, even though none of the member states has criminalised 
specifically slavery and domestic servitude,34 at the time in question. 
28  Chapman v UK [GC] (App no 27238/95) ECHR 2001-I. See also Coster v UK [GC] 
(App no 24876/94) ECHR 18 January 2001; Jane Smith v UK [GC] (App no 25154/94) ECHR 18 
January 2001; Lee v UK [GC] (App no 25289/94) ECHR 18 January 2001; Beard v UK [GC] (App 
no 24882/94) ECHR 18 January 2001.
29  Ibid, para 39.
30  Ibid.
31  Frette v France, (App no 36515/97) ECHR 2002-I. The Court’s approach to adoption 
of children by homosexuals has changed in E.B. v France [GC] (App no 43546/02) ECHR 2008- , 
where there was no reference to the margin of appreciation.
32  Marckx v Belgium (App no 6833/74) (1979) Series A no 31.
33 Convention of 12 September 1962 on the Establishment of Maternal Affiliation 
of Natural Children; The European Convention of 15 October 1975 on the Legal Status 
of Children born out of Wedlock. Ibid, para 41.
34  Siliadin v France (App no 73313/01) ECHR 2005. The Court looked at the Forced 
Labour Convention; the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery and Slave Trade 
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(para 51).
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Yet sometimes the Court refers to the ‘evolution of social attitudes’ as an 
indication of a consensus.35 For example, in MC v Bulgaria, a case challenging 
ineffectiveness of rape laws and prosecutorial practices, the Court held that the 
evolution of social attitudes towards equality of sexes requires that every form 
of non-consensual sex is criminalised as rape, including cases where the victim 
does not physically resist,  although not many member states have taken this 
approach.36
Finally, in some cases the Court simply states that there is no consensus without 
analysing the practices of member states or international law. This is generally the 
approach in cases where rights interfere with the aim of the protection of morals. In 
such cases the Court simply declares that there is a lack of a common conception 
of morals, without analysing the practices of member states or international and 
comparative law standards on the issue in question.37 
Thus, the Court’s approach to determining consensus and likewise to the 
application of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation has not been consistent. It is 
difficult to discern the factors that influence the Court’s approach.38 The Court has not 
consistently defined consensus even in respect of the same subject matters. This is best 
exemplified in a series of ‘transsexual cases’ against the UK challenging its failure to 
recognise in law the post-operative sex of a transsexual.39 In the first such case, Rees v 
UK, the Court gave the state a wide margin of appreciation in light of ‘little common 
ground between the Contracting States in this area’ and found no violation of the 
Convention.40 Four years later in Cossey, the Court noted new developments in the 
member states and international law since the Rees judgment (focusing in particular on 
the Resolution on Discrimination against Transsexuals adopted by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe and Recommendation 1117 on the Conditions 
of Transsexuals adopted by the Committee of Ministers).41 However, it held that 
these instruments reveal ‘the same diversity of practice among member states’ and 
accordingly that ‘it cannot at present be said that a departure from the Court’s earlier 
decision is warranted in order to ensure that the interpretation of Article 8 on the point 
at issue remains in line with present-day conditions’.42 The Court however noted that 
‘since the Convention always has to be interpreted and applied in the light of current 
35  In cases where emphasis is placed on ‘changing social conditions’, the Court may 
or may not look in addition at the laws and practices of the member states and international 
developments. 
36  MC v Bulgaria (App no 39272/98) ECHR 2003-VII.
37  These cases are discussed in the subsequent section.
38  A general observation can be made that the Court is less concerned with the lack of a 
common approach in cases  involving obligations to protect women from violence, than  in those 
involving reproductive or sexual rights (as these implicate ‘morality’).
39  The applicants argued a violation of Articles 8 (right to respect for private and family life, 
home and correspondence), 12 (right to marry) and 14 (non-discrimination). 
40  Rees v UK, supra note 27.
41  Ibid, para 40.
42  Cossey v UK, supra note 27, para 40.
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circumstances, it is important that the need for appropriate legal measures in this area 
should be kept under review’.43 Eight years later, in Sheffield and Horsham v UK, the 
Court, examining a comparative study submitted by Liberty, held: 
The Court is not fully satisfied that the legislative trends … suffice to establish 
the existence of any common European approach to the problems created by 
the recognition in law of post-operative gender status. In particular, the survey 
does not indicate that there is as yet any common approach as to how to address 
the repercussions which the legal recognition of a change of sex may entail for 
other areas of law such as marriage, filiation, privacy or data protection, or the 
circumstances in which a transsexual may be compelled by law to reveal his or 
her pre-operative gender. 44
Holding that ‘transsexualism raises complex scientific, legal, moral and 
social issues, in respect of which there is no generally shared approach among the 
Contracting States’, 45 the Court found no violation.46 
The Court finally changed its approach in Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom 
and I v United Kingdom.47 In these two almost identical judgments, the Court first 
noted that it must have regard to ‘the changing conditions within the respondent State 
and within Contracting States generally’ and respond to any ‘evolving convergence 
as to the standards to be achieved’.48 In a section entitled ‘the state of any European 
and international consensus’ the Court argued, referring to a comparative study by 
Liberty (emphasising in particular the developments in New Zealand and Australia) 
that there was a ‘continuous international trend in favour not only of increased social 
acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-
operative transsexuals’ that justifies departing from its previous case-law even though 
there was still ‘a lack of common approach as to how to address the repercussions 
which the legal recognition of a change of sex may entail’.49 The Court held that ‘the 
lack of such a common approach among forty-three Contracting States with widely 
diverse legal systems and traditions is hardly surprising’ and that in accordance with 
the principle of subsidiarity the states have a wide margin of appreciation.50 However, 
the margin was given in respect of ‘resolving within their domestic legal systems the 
practical problems created by the legal recognition of post-operative gender status’, 
43  Ibid, para 42.
44  Sheffield and Horsham v UK (supra note 27) para 57.
45  Ibid, para 58.
46  The Court’s majority had begun to shift progressively from twelve votes to three in 
1986 in Rees v UK (supra note 27) to eleven votes to nine in 1998 in Sheffield and Horsham v UK 
(ibid).
47  Christine Goodwin v UK [GC] (App no 28957/95) ECHR 2002-VI; I v UK [GC] (App 
no 25680/94) ECHR 11 July 2002. Both judgments were delivered unanimously.
48 Christine  Goodwin v UK (ibid) para 84. 
49  Ibid, para 85.
50  Ibid.
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and not in respect of securing the recognition in law of the new gender status.51
This approach to consensus and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation has 
a potential for achieving a more inclusive jurisprudence which would respect the 
rights of the members of vulnerable groups. It shows sensitiveness to the context, 
and engages in empathic reasoning52 that displays an understanding of disadvantage, 
which is necessary for protecting the rights of disadvantaged groups and addressing 
discrimination and disadvantage that they face. 
In this case, the Court asked the ‘question of exclusion and disadvantage’. It 
asked whether the challenged measure failed to take into account the perspective of 
transsexuals, what the effects of the omission are (whether they perpetuate or produce 
the disadvantage) and how to take the perspective of transsexuals into account. In 
answering these questions, the Court looked at the progressive developments in 
international and comparative law which document the disadvantage of transsexuals, 
rather than conditioning the answer upon the acceptance of the majority of member 
states. 
Such an approach is very important from the perspective of the protection of 
the rights of vulnerable groups, as in respect of the rights of these groups, a common 
approach among the member states is usually more slowly developed  as opposed to 
the cases involving classic civil and political rights. However, it has generally not 
been applied in the cases involving ‘moral issues’, which have most often been the 
cases concerning sexual and gender mores and reproductive self-determination, i.e. 
issues which concern the rights of sexual and gender minorities and women. 
6. Protection of morals 
In cases where rights were interfered with for the protection of morals, or which 
were seen as involving ‘moral’ issues, the Court has tended to give states a wide 
margin of appreciation. 53  In many of these cases the wide margin was justified on 
account of the absence of a consensus, even though there was in fact a common 
51  Ibid.
52  L Henderson, ‘Legality and Empathy’ (1986-1987) 85 Michigan Law Review 1574
53  In this category of cases we could place cases concerning sexual education: Handyside 
v UK (supra note 7); unconventional homosexual sex activities: Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v UK 
(App nos 21627/93, 21826/93 and 21974/93) ECHR 1997-I; adoption of children by homosexuals 
prior to EB v France (supra note): Frette v France (supra note 31) rights of transsexuals in respect 
to parenting a child conceived by IVF: X, Y and Z v UK (App no 21830/93) ECHR 1997-II; and 
prior to Christine Goodwin v UK (supra note 47 ), recognition of new sex identity of transsexuals 
and their right to marry (discussed above); as well as reproductive self-determination cases: X v UK 
(also cited as Patton v UK) (dec) (App no 8416/78) (1980) 3 EHRR 408 (EComHR); RH v Norway 
(dec) (App no 17004/90) (1992) 73 DR 155 (EComHR); Boso v Italy (dec) (App no 50490/99) 
ECHR 2002-VII; Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland (App nos 14234/88 and 14235/88) 
(1992) Series A 246-A; Brüggemann and Scheuten v Germany (App no 6959/75) (1997) 3 EHRR 
244 (EComHR); Tysiąc  v Poland (App no 5410/03) ECHR 2007-; D v Ireland (dec) (App no 
26499/02) ECHR 28 June 2006, Vo v France [GC] (App no 53924/00) ECHR 2004-VIII.
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approach among the member states, or international instruments on the issue.54 The 
approach seems to depend rather on how unconventional the activity in question is 
(according to the dominant norm): the less conventional it is in view of majority 
standards, the less likely it is that the Court will find a violation. 
In cases concerning women’s reproductive self-determination, the Convention 
organs have consistently held that states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in 
regulating terminations of pregnancy on account of there being no consensus in 
‘such a delicate area’.55 In RH v Norway, for example, the Commission concluded 
that there was no consensus on abortion with, national laws on abortion ‘differing 
considerably’, even though only a few member states had restrictive abortion laws at 
the time of  the decision.56 
The Court also found the existence of a common approach among member states 
to be irrelevant in Handyside v UK.57 The fact that the book in question circulated freely 
in most of the member states (as well as in other parts of the UK, except England) 
did not convince the Court that the margin should be narrower with respect to the 
UK (and neither did the importance of the freedom of expression for a democratic 
society). The most important factor which was said to justify the interference was 
that ‘it is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting States 
a uniform European conception of morals.’58 This was also a determinative factor in 
finding that an interference with the freedom of expression was justified in Müller and 
Others v Switzerland,59 Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria,60 and Wingrove v UK.61
The lack of a common conception of morals was less relevant in Dudgeon v 
UK, which concerned a challenge to the criminalisation of male homosexual sexual 
activities in Northern Ireland.62 The Court explained that the scope of the margin is 
affected not only by the nature of the aim of the restriction, but also by the nature 
of the activities involved. It held that the fact at issue was ‘a most intimate aspect of 
private life’, and distinguished this case from the Handyside.63 The Court also placed 
emphasis on the fact that the great majority of the members states did not criminalise 
such behaviour in finding that there was no pressing social need for doing so in 
Northern Ireland.
However, in Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v UK the Court found the conviction 
54  If we take Helfer’s classification, in these cases the Court examines European public 
opinion in order to determine existence or a absence of a consensus: supra note 26.
55  X v UK; RH v Norway; Boso v Italy; Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland; 
Brüggemann and Scheuten v Germany; Tysiąc  v Poland; D v Ireland, Vo v France. All cited supra 
note 53.
56  RH v Norway (supra note 53).
57  Supra note 7.
58  Handyside v UK (supra note 7) para 49.
59  Muller v Switzerland (App no 10737/84) (1988) Series A no 133.
60  Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria (App no 13470/87) (1991) Series A no 295-A.
61  Wingrove v UK (App no 17419/90) ECHR 1996-V.
62  Dudgeon v UK (App no 7525/76) (1981) Series A no 45).
63  Ibid, para 52.
x 05 Radacic, The Margin.indd   609 31.5.2010   7:49:14
I. RADAČIĆ, The margin of appreciation, consensus, morality and...
Zb. Prav. fak. Rij. (1991) v. 31, br. 1, 599-616 (2010)610
of the applicants for the consensual adult homosexual sadomasochistic sex activities 
justified as necessary for the protection of health or morals, even though this case 
also concerned the most intimate aspects of private life.64 The Court distinguished 
this case from Dudgeon in that this case concerned activities which inflict physical 
harm, which the state ‘is unquestionably entitled to regulate, through the operation 
of criminal law’.65 The fact that the activities involved willing adults in a private 
controlled environment and that they did not result in any serious injury66 did 
not convince the Court that the conviction of the applicants might not have been 
‘necessary in democratic society’.67 Moreover, it did not matter that some other 
non-sexual activities, such as boxing, were not criminalised, which suggests that 
the determinative factor was their unconventional (homo)sexual nature rather than 
the harm involved.68 The purpose of the criminalisation was the enforcement of 
conventional sexual morality. The Court affirmed this enforcement, even though the 
enforcement of this sexual ‘morality’ through criminalisation of sadomasochistic sex 
was arguably itself immoral from the perspective of human rights as it punished the 
applicants for expressing themselves sexually in a way that might be found distasteful 
by some, but which did not involve violation of other people’s rights (as the activities 
did not harm anyone who did not consent to them).69 Thus, the Court failed to ask the 
‘question of exclusion and disadvantage.’
While the Court might have feared legitimately to impose ‘sexual morals’ in 
terms of appropriate sexual behaviour, in cases where it has deferred to the state’s 
concept of morals, the Court has actually imposed a dominant concept of morality 
64  Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v UK (supra note 53).
65  Ibid, para 43.
66  The Court found it relevant that they might have caused serious injury. This is contrary 
to the Court’s general approach in which it limits its role to the assessment of the facts of the cases, 
defining its task as narrowly as possible. 
67  The Court has even expressed doubt about whether it could be held that the activities 
belong to the sphere of private life, since the activities involved a number of people, the recruitment 
of new ‘members’, the provision of several specially equipped chambers, and the shooting of many 
videotapes which were distributed among the ‘members’. It did not examine the question further 
since it was not disputed by the parties that the activities fell within the scope of ‘private life’.
68  The applicants also argued that they were singled out for prosecution because they were 
homosexuals and supported this claim by the judgment in R v Wilson [1996] CrAppR 241 (CA) 
where the similar behaviour of heterosexual married couple was not considered to merit criminal 
punishment. The Court simply dismissed this argument. For a comparison of these cases, see M 
Weait, ‘Harm, Consent and the Limits of Privacy’ (2005) 13 Feminist Legal Studies 97. In addition to 
this claim of differential application of the law, another claim of discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation could be made. It could be argued that criminalisation of sadomasochistic sex constitutes 
indirect discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, since much more homosexuals than 
heterosexuals engage in such sexual practices. A measure which has discriminatory effect should 
not be justified on account of the protection of morals. It is difficult to see how public morals are 
served by discriminating against the minority.
69  See C Nowlin, ‘The Protection of Morals under the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 264.
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enforced by the majority against the minority,70 a morality which justifies the 
infringement of human rights of those who do not accept it. This is contrary to the 
Court’s role as a human rights institution. Moreover, it is also contrary to the goal of 
preserving cultural diversity, as it undermines cultural diversity within the country. 
Finally, deferring to the state’s concept of morals in situations like these, might 
undermine rather than enhance democracy, as the minority against whom the ‘morals’ 
are enforced usually does not have an effective voice in the political processes.71 
Hence, the Court should not automatically defer to the concept of morality 
defined by the state, or by a majority of the states, but should define morality in 
accordance with the values of the Convention (in particular the values of autonomy, 
equality and human dignity). As argued by Nowlin, ‘where no harm to others 
is involved and the harm to participants is consensual, the basic human right to 
determine one’s “self”, or the … right of individual to “live his or her life as he or she 
may choose”, cannot be restricted in the name of legal moralism.’72 Reference in the 
Convention to protecting public morals should thus be construed to mean respect for 
the moral rights of others.73 The freedom to express one self could thus be legitimately 
interfered with only when the exercise of this freedom violates the rights of others, 
and not on account of majoritarian preferences. This is the morality that the Court 
should endorse, as it is consistent with the idea of universal human rights based on 
the principles of autonomy, equality and human dignity. 
7. Conclusion
The Court is a human rights institution whose task is to secure the respect for 
minimum standards which protect human dignity, autonomy, and equality of all 
people under the jurisdiction of the member states. Deference to the state’s margin of 
appreciation in cases where the Court finds no consensus on the issue in question, or 
where the government invokes the protection of morality as the reason for interference 
with Convention rights, undermines the exercise of the Court’s task as it conditions 
the rights of the members of the vulnerable groups by the acceptance of the majority 
of the states, or the majority within the state. Such a use of the doctrine also does 
not serve the goals that the doctrine is supposed to protect, as it undermines cultural 
diversity within the states, and does not correct systematic deficiencies of democratic 
processes.
This does not mean that the doctrine of the margin of appreciation should not have 
a place in the international supervisory system of human rights, but only that it should 
70  By minority I mean not only traditional minorities, such as ethnic or religious, but also 
‘political outcasts’ and less powerful members of the society, whether or not they constitute a 
minority in terms of numbers.
71  S Fredman, ‘Human Rights Transformed: Positives Duties and Positive Rights’ [2006] 
Public Law 498.
72  Nowlin (supra note 69) 282.
73  Ibid, 286.
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not be applied in a manner that shields the conduct of the state from supervision and 
justifies violation of the rights of minorities on the basis of majoritarian preferences. 
Hence, while states should enjoy the margin of appreciation in respect of choosing 
the means to secure the human rights standards imposed by the Court, they should not 
have discretion in respect of choosing whether or not to implement these standards 
in light of the interests of majority of states or within the state.74 The Court should 
always undertake a review of a challenged action or omission and never simply 
defer to the state’s judgment. Review should be heightened, rather than lenient, in 
cases which concern the conflict between majorities and minorities.75 The Court’s 
assessment should be guided by the values of autonomy, equality and human dignity, 
which presupposes searching for, and challenging, exclusion and disadvantage of 
vulnerable groups. 
The diversity or uniformity of state practices, or the lack of uniform conception 
of morality, should not be a relevant consideration in enforcing (universal) human 
rights. Not enforcing human rights because of a lack of a consensus (because the 
majority does not lead the lifestyle of the applicant or does not suffer her problems) 
is contrary to the principle of equality on which human rights are based. Therefore, 
the Court should give less significance to the (non-)existence of a common approach 
among the member states and to the lack of a consensus on conception of morals, and 
look instead at the international human rights instruments or progressive developments 
in comparative jurisprudence on the issue in question, as the latter are usually more 
sensitive to disadvantage of vulnerable groups. This has been the approach of the 
Court more recently and it is to be hoped that the Court will continue to apply it in 
a consistent manner, including when rights are interfered with for the protection of 
morals.76 Such an interpretation of the margin of appreciation would be in accordance 
with the principle of effectiveness and the evolutive approach to interpretation.
It could be argued that the shift of focus from the question of consensus (among 
member states) to the questions of exclusion and disadvantage, does not take into 
account the political constraints within which the Court operates, or that it would 
undermine representative democracy or the cultural diversity of Europe, or the 
authority of the Court (which, it has been argued, are served by the use of consensus 
as an interpretative principle). However, shifting the approach does not have these 
consequences. As the members of disadvantaged minorities or less powerful groups 
have not been given an effective voice in political processes, asking the ‘question 
of exclusion and disadvantage’ might enhance democratic ideals, by remedying 
systematic deficiencies of democratic processes in accordance with the role that 
international human rights bodies are supposed to serve. Moreover, cultural diversity 
might also be enhanced by asking the ‘question of exclusion and disadvantage’, as it 
74  Hence, while the state could choose means to secure recognition in law of the post-
operative transsexual, it cannot choose whether or not to do so.
75  Benvenisti (supra note 1).
76  Christine Goodwin v UK (supra note 47); I v UK (supra note 47); MC v Bulgaria (supra 
note 36); Siliadin v France (supra note 34).
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would promote respect for the cultural values of minorities (provided that they do not 
result in violation of rights of others). Furthermore, the authority of the Court might be 
served by having consistent decision-making tools (asking ‘the question of exclusion 
and disadvantage’), rather than deferring to the state’s will. Asking the ‘question 
of exclusion and disadvantage’ is not an impossible task: the marginalisation and 
disadvantage of certain groups have long been documented in international human 
rights discourse, and group-specific human rights law can elucidate many of the 
issues.
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Summary
THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION, CONSENSUS, MORALITY 
AND THE RIGHTS OF VULNERABLE GROUPS
The doctrine of the margin of appreciation is one of the most controversial 
developments of the European Court of Human Rights, which, in view of many 
scholars, impedes the development of universal standards of human rights. The Court 
has most often used it to defer to the state’s judgment on what the protection of 
Convention rights requires if there is no consensus on this issue, or if the government 
invokes the protection of morality as the reason for interference with Convention 
rights. 
The author criticises such a use of the doctrine examining the ways consensus 
and morals have been interpreted in the case-law. The author argues that deference to 
the state’s judgment in case there is a lack of a common approach among the member 
states on the relevant issue, or when the issue concerning the (sexual) ‘morality’, 
presents an obstacle for the effective protection of the rights of vulnerable groups, 
due to the fact that it conditions their protection with the acceptance by the majority of 
the states or the majority within the state. It is maintained that the Court should never 
allow to the states a margin of appreciation to decide what standards the Convention 
imposes except in cases when the states decide on implementation of these standards. 
In determining the standard, the Court should be guided by the values of autonomy, 
equality and human dignity, rather than by the issue of consensus, which presupposes 
searching for and challenging the exclusion and disadvantage of vulnerable groups. 
Key words: margin of appreciation, consensus, morals, rights of 
 vulnerable groups.
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Zusammenfassung
ERMESSENS- ODER BEURTEILUNGSSPIELRAUM, KONSENS, 
MORAL UND DIE RECHTE DER SCHUTZBEDÜRFTIGEN 
PERSONENGRUPPEN
Die Ermessensdoktrin zählt zu den meist bestrittenen Entwicklungen des 
Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte. Nach Ansicht einiger Autoren, 
beeinträchtigt dies auch die Entwicklung der allgemeinen Normen der Menschenrechte. 
Diese Doktrin wird vom Gerichtshof meistens dann angewandt, wenn kein Konsens 
darüber besteht, was der Schutz der Konventionsrechte benötigt, oder wenn die 
Regierung als Grund des Eingriffs in die Konventionsrechte den Moralschutz geltend 
macht. In der vorliegenden Arbeit übt die Autorin Kritik über eine solche Anwendung 
der genannten Doktrin, indem sie die Auslegung von Konsens und Moral in der 
Rechtsprechung ausarbeitet. Wie sie behauptet, im Falle dass kein Konsens erreicht 
wird, und keine gemeinsame Einstellung der Mitgliedstaaten besteht,  oder wenn es 
um (sexuelle) Moral geht, sei das Ermessen der Mitgliedstaaten ein Hindernis für den 
effizienten Schutz der Rechte von schutzbedürftigen Personengruppen, weil dafür 
entweder eine Mehrheit von Staaten, oder eine Mehrheit innerhalb des jeweiligen 
Mitgliedstaates erforderlich ist. Aus diesem Grunde sollte es der Gerichtshof nicht 
den Mitgliedstaaten überlassen, über die von der Konvention verhängten Normen 
Entscheidungen zu treffen, mit der Ausnahme der Implementierung dieser Normen. 
Darüber hinaus sollte der Gerichtshof bei der Feststellung dieser Normen von Werten 
wie Autonomie, Gleichheit und menschliche Würde, statt von Konsens geleitet 
werden, weil dieser Fragen der Ausschließung und Benachteiligung schutzbedürftiger 
Personengruppen mit sich bringt.
Schlüsselwörter: Ermessens- oder Beurteilungsspielraum, Konsens, 
 Moral, Rechte der schutzbedürftigen Personengruppen.
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Riassunto
I MARGINI DI APPREZZAMENTO, CONSENSO, MORALITÀ E 
DIRITTI DEI GRUPPI VULNERABILI
La dottrina relativa al concetto del libero apprezzamento rappresenta una delle 
creazioni più controverse della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, la quale secondo 
l’opinione di numerosi studiosi ostacola lo sviluppo di standards universali dei diritti 
dell’uomo. Il più frequente uso che ne fa la Corte è volto a richiamare i pareri delle 
autorità statali sul contenuto della tutela dei diritti convenzionali, laddove manchi un 
consenso oppure qualora le autorità invochino la protezione di valori morali al fine di 
interferire nei diritti convenzionali.
Nel presente lavoro, mediante un’analisi dell’interpretazione del consenso 
e della morale nella giurisprudenza della Corte, viene criticato siffatto uso della 
dottrina.
L’autrice sostiene come il richiamo al parere dello Stato, nei casi in cui non esista 
un approccio comune agli Stati membri, oppure quando la questione rilevante concerne 
la «morale» (sessuale), rappresenti un impedimento ai fini di un’efficace tutela dei 
diritti dei gruppi vulnerabili; giacché la stessa viene condizionata dal suo accoglimento 
da parte della maggioranza degli Stati ovvero da parte della maggioranza all’interno 
dello Stato. L’autrice ritiene che la Corte non dovrebbe dare agli stati margini di 
libero apprezzamento per stabilire quali standards siano imposti dalla Convenzione, 
bensì permettere di stabilire unicamente le modalità di recepimento di tali standards. 
Nel determinare gli standards, la Corte dovrebbe seguire i valori dell’eguaglianza, 
dell’autonomia e della dignità, anziché del consenso, il che presuppone la ricerca e la 
resistenza all’emarginazione ed all’inadeguatezza.
Parole chiave:  margini di libero apprezzamento, consenso, morale, 
 diritti dei gruppi vulnerabili.
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